Legal Interoperability Issues in International Cooperation Measures to Secure the Maritime Commons by Allen, Craig
University of Washington School of Law
UW Law Digital Commons
Books Faculty Publications
12-31-2006
Legal Interoperability Issues in International
Cooperation Measures to Secure the Maritime
Commons
Craig Allen
University of Washington School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/faculty-books
Part of the Admiralty Commons, and the International Law Commons
This Book Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at UW Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Books by an authorized administrator of UW Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact cnyberg@uw.edu.
Recommended Citation
Craig Allen, Legal Interoperability Issues in International Cooperation Measures to Secure the Maritime Commons, in Economics and
Maritime Strategy: Implications for the 21st Century 119 (Richmond M. Lloyd ed. eds., 2006).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/faculty-books/43

Panel V
International Cooperation in Securing the
Maritime Commons
Professor Craig H. Allen
Charles H. Stockton Professor of International Law, U.S. Naval War College
Vice Admiral Lutz Feldt
German Navy (Retired)
Moderator:
Dr. Thomas R. Fedyszyn
Security, Strategy, and Forces Course Director, National Security Decision Making
Department, U.S. Naval War College
D:\_wip\_Ruger Workshop\_Ventura\Ruger_Nov2006_Final.vp
Friday, December 22, 2006 1:43:01 PM
Color profile: Generic CMYK printer profile
Composite  Default screen
Legal Interoperability Issues in International
Cooperation Measures to Secure the
Maritime Commons
Professor Craig H. Allen
Charles H. Stockton Professor of International Law
U.S. Naval War College
1
The life of the law has not been logic, but experience.
—Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common Law
Introduction
I would first like to say that I much prefer the phrase “securing the commons” to the more pro-
vocative and inaccurate “command of the commons.” The latter is impossible to objectively as-
sess and, more important to me, a legal oxymoron. The commons are just that: a shared space
not subject to any nation’s sovereignty or control, and, for that reason, a space where all states
have an obligation to promote and enforce the public order necessary to prevent a tragedy in
those commons, whether by overuse, abuse, or malevolent misuse. The U.S. approach re-
flected in the National Strategy for Maritime Security (2005) eschews any pretension to “com-
mand” of the maritime commons, calling instead for enhanced maritime domain awareness
and an active, layered defense, together with measures to reduce vulnerability and improve
consequence management readiness.
In a workshop of distinguished economists, I confess my lack of competency on all matters in-
volving the dismal science and will instead focus my remarks on some of the salient legal issues
raised by the title of this panel—more specifically, on legal interoperability issues. On this ques-
tion I am happy to report that over the past five years or so the law has adapted to our often
tragic “experience” (to quote Justice Holmes) in a number of proactive ways, in an effort to an-
ticipate conflicts and eliminate them where possible. However, more work lies ahead.
Combined operations—particularly coalition operations—are one area where more remains to
be done. The U.S. Army’s Operational Law Handbook sets the scene. It explains that
The United States often chooses to participate in operations alongside other nations. While some
of these operations are conducted within an established alliance such as NATO, others are coali-
tion action. Coalition action is multinational action outside the bounds of established alliances,
usually for single occasions or longer cooperation in a narrow sector of common interest. Recent
examples are Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom. Unlike NATO opera-
tions, coalition action by its nature does not have a predetermined structure or decision-making
process.
[One] disadvantage of coalition action is that it often raises significant interoperability issues that
need to be resolved to ensure success of the operation.
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1. Charles H. Stockton Chair in International Law, U.S. Naval War College. I am indebted to Colonel Michael
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Interoperability issues arise for a number of reasons. First, the coalition partner may have differ-
ent legal obligations, such as being signatory to a treaty to which the United States is not a party
and which the United States does not consider customary international law. Second, the United
States and the coalition partner may both be legally bound by a provision of international law, by
treaty or custom, but may interpret their obligations differently. Finally some differences may not
result from law at all, but from the application of domestic policy.2
Planning for multinational operations in the maritime commons may take one of several forms.
In established alliances, such as NATO, planners can address interoperability issues through
prior agreements, such as the Allied Publication series and the NATO standardization agree-
ments (STANAGs). In what is sometimes referred to as proactive, “Phase Zero” planning, the
geographic combatant commanders prepare theater security cooperation plans for their areas
of responsibility. Those plans typically call for military-military exchanges and other relation-
ship-building measures with other forces in the theater, to improve military capabilities and
interoperability. Finally, there is the ad hoc planning approach, hopefully drawing on planning
models and templates.
Actual maritime security operations within the various theaters may be carried out unilaterally, by
established alliances, such as NATO, or by coalition actions, such as the Commander Task Force
150 operations in the far western Indian Ocean and Red Sea approaches off the Horn of Africa.
Other recent, and nongeographically specific, partnering initiatives include the Proliferation Se-
curity Initiative and the 1,000-ship navy concept—now called the Global Maritime Partnership.3
At-sea maritime operations take a variety of names, including maritime security operations
(mentioned above),4 or more specific labels, such as maritime interception operations,5 mari-
time interdiction operations,6 or maritime law enforcement operations.7 In some cases the legal
basis for the maritime operation comes from a UN Security Council resolution or a right of indi-
vidual or collective self-defense, but in many of the boardings the legal basis for the “end game”
ultimately lies in the extraterritorial application of some nation’s domestic law. Regardless of
the form of the cooperative arrangement, the participating states often come to the table with
divergent rule sets (legal authorities and restrictions).8 Despite the pressure of globalization to
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2. U.S. Army Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School, Operational Law Handbook (Charlottesville,
Va.: U.S. Army Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School, 2006), at pp. 527–30.
3. The U.S. Navy CNO has called the 1,000-ship navy “a network of international navies, coast guards,
maritime forces, port operators, commercial shippers and local law enforcement, all working together.”
4. Maritime security operation missions include ensuring freedom of navigation, the flow of commerce, and the
protection of ocean resources, and securing the maritime domain from nation-state threats, terrorism, drug
trafficking, and other forms of transnational crime, piracy, environmental destruction and illegal seaborne
immigration. Chief of Naval Operations and Commandant of the Marine Corps, Naval Operations Concept
(2006).
5. U.S. Navy, Maritime Interception Operations, NTTP 3-07.11/CGP 3-07.11 (2003) (defining “interception” as
the “legitimate action of denying suspect vessels access to specific ports for import or export of prohibited
goods to or from a specified nation or nations, for purposes of peacekeeping or to enforce imposed
sanctions.”). “Expanded” MIO refers to interception operations in the absence of a collective security
measure.
6. See Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Joint Interdiction Operations, Jt. Pub. 3-03 (1997), which
defines interdiction as “an action to divert, disrupt, delay or destroy the enemy’s surface military potential
before it can be used effectively against friendly forces.” Within the U.S. National Strategy for Maritime
Security framework, interdiction is described as “actions taken to divert, delay, intercept, board, detain, or
destroy, as appropriate, suspect vessels, people, and cargo.” “Interdiction” is the favored term in most NATO
countries. It is also used in the Proliferation Security Initiative “Statement of Interdiction Principles.” On the
other hand, it is disfavored by some states, particularly China.
7. Maritime law enforcement operations refer to activities by officials with the legal authority to detect crimes,
apprehend violators, and gather the evidence necessary to support prosecution.
8. For the lawyer, legal interoperability questions are typically analyzed under the “conflict of laws” framework.
Proactive lawyers seek to avoid conflicts by, for example, working to unify and/or harmonize the laws, or at
least being clear about which law will apply to a given transaction, through insertion of a choice of law clause.
D:\_wip\_Ruger Workshop\_Ventura\Ruger_Nov2006_Final.vp
Friday, December 22, 2006 1:43:02 PM
Color profile: Generic CMYK printer profile
Composite  Default screen
harmonize the law and make it more uniform, differences continue to exist, whether on matters
of trade, immigration, maritime crime, security cooperation, disclosure of intelligence, or the in-
terpretation or application of law of the sea or law of armed conflict issues. As a result, the par-
ticipating states must confront several recurring legal interoperability issues. For this synopsis,
several issues are highlighted for possible discussion:
• Rules of Engagement
• Rules regarding the right to exercise self-defense
• Targeting issues (i.e., what is a “military objective”; proportionality issues)
• Use of certain means and methods (landmines, chemical riot control agents)
• Status and treatment of detainees
• Status of armed forces (SOFAs, VFAs, Article 98 agreements)
• Access to information and intelligence.
Theater security cooperation plans can help avoid or mitigate some of the common legal
interoperability problems, but they have never received the funding needed to reach their full
potential. In some cases, the divergent rule sets can in fact be harmonized into “combined
forces” rules, as in the case of Combined Rules of Engagement (CROE). Another commonly
used approach to work through or around such issues calls for the participating states to collec-
tively prepare a “legal matrix” that displays the key elements of their respective rule sets and re-
veals any variations. The difference in the two approaches is an important one: in the first, the
relevant rules are in fact harmonized (often, however, by reducing the rules to the least com-
mon denominator); in the latter, national differences are maintained, but once collected into
the matrix by the operational commander they are at least available for communication to the
participating units, though classification issues and other objections might impede the full real-
ization of that goal.
The U.S. Naval War College, with the support of its International Law Department and the affil-
iated Naval Reserve components, has taken the initiative to address a number of these recur-
ring issues, by, for example, sponsoring flag- and general-officer-level courses for Combined
Forces Maritime Component Commanders, where interoperability issues can be analyzed and
minimized as much as possible; and by its work on drafting model CROE and on collecting and
clarifying the discordant laws governing maritime exclusionary zones. One subject where addi-
tional efforts to promote legal interoperability are needed is in intelligence matters.9
Legal Interoperability on Intelligence Matters
It has become commonplace to criticize the intelligence community for its secretive, stove-
piped approach, which, as famously described by the U.S. 9/11 Commission, impedes their
ability to “connect the dots.” While such criticism might be politically popular, it reveals a
shameful disregard for the underlying legal and policy issues, to say nothing of the practical lim-
itations that militate against wider disclosure of some classified information. Nevertheless, a
number of recent studies, presidential directives, statutes, and international agreements have
called for greater intelligence-sharing. Not surprisingly, the 9/11 Commission was among the
first. Congress soon followed, demanding greater intelligence-sharing in the 2004 Intelligence
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Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act. The new catchphrase admonishes that the old “need-to-
know” restriction must give way to a “need-to-share” approach, an approach that’s increas-
ingly facilitated by the policy directing members of the intelligence community to “write for re-
lease.”10 In 2003, the states participating in the Proliferation Security Initiative agreed to a
Statement of Interdiction Principles that provides a framework for intelligence-sharing in
counterproliferation operations. In 2004, the G-8 states entered into an agreement that called
upon the member states to pass legislation if necessary to ensure that terrorism information can
be shared internally with police and prosecutors and externally with other countries. The G-8
agreement also recommended that each state ensure it can legally use a variety of “special in-
vestigative techniques,” such as wiretaps, audio and visual surveillance, and interception of
electronic communications.
The call for greater intelligence-sharing in some areas of common concern and concerted ac-
tion carried over into the National Strategy for Maritime Security and its eight supporting plans.
One of those supporting plans lays out the means to achieve greater Maritime Domain Aware-
ness (MDA); another provides the framework for Global Maritime Intelligence Integration. But
any discussion of sharing must give careful consideration to the applicable legal limits on doing
so. It is almost certainly the case that some components of the MDA system, or information in
the MDA system, will not be disclosable to foreign nations under existing law. Doing so may re-
veal sources and methods in a way that may cost the lives of the former and the long-term effec-
tiveness of the latter. Within the United States, we must also grapple with the legal restrictions
on providing proprietary information and information obtained through intelligence channels
to law enforcement agencies—a question only partly addressed by the Foreign Intelligence Sur-
veillance Act, USA PATRIOT Act, and Maritime Operational Threat Response plan. This is not
the forum to explore these technical and partly classified interoperability issues. Let me just say
that more work might be needed, either to clarify the restrictions or to at least avoid unreason-
able expectations on the part of coalition partners.
Let me close with a short list of some of the recurring intelligence- and law-related
interoperability issues that coalition commanders and operators and their intelligence officers
and lawyers should be prepared to address and respond to (I would be happy to discuss any of
these with the distinguished panelists):
• A request to disclose the factual basis for invoking the right of self-defense (i.e., proof of
an imminent threat) to the UN Security Council, a regional security body, or a coalition
partner.
• A request by a partner state to disclose the basis for concluding that a potential target
constitutes a “military objective,” or that striking that target would not violate the
prohibition on “disproportionate” use of force.
• A request by a partner state (or flag state) to disclose the basis for a boarding, search,
seizure, or arrest, where the governing legal standard is “reasonable basis to believe,”
“probable cause to believe,” or something similar.
• A request from a partner state (or an international criminal tribunal) to disclose
intelligence for use in a criminal prosecution. In U.S. prosecutions, this issue is addressed
in the less-than-pellucid or -predictable Classified Information Procedures Act.
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10. See, e.g., Director of Central Intelligence, Directive 8/1 (June 4, 2004) (defining “write to release” as: “A
general approach whereby intelligence reports are written in such a way that sources and methods are
disguised so that the report can be distributed to customers or intelligence partners at lower security levels. In
essence, write-to-release is proactive sanitization that makes intelligence more readily available to a more
diverse set of customers. The term encompasses a number of specific implementation approaches, including
sanitized leads and Tearline reporting.”).
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Conclusion
In a workshop of legal experts from around the world, held in this same room last week, 94 per-
cent of the experts stated that they believe future U.S. Navy operations will be “more com-
bined.” Assuming they are right, the effectiveness of future international cooperation in
securing the maritime commons will require us to continue to work toward resolving legal
interoperability questions. Experience has shown that information-sharing not only serves to
improve security-related decision making, it can also be an effective trust-building measure. Al-
though there are plainly good reasons to facilitate timely and effective information-sharing in
many cases, it is important not to lose sight of the fact that increased disclosure might come at
the expense of the long-term effectiveness of the intelligence community. The solution to legal
interoperability issues is not to eliminate every national restriction, but rather to carefully review
the disclosure laws and policies, to ensure any unnecessary restrictions on disclosure are re-
moved, to follow the write-for-release policy when drafting intelligence products as much as
possible, and then to ensure that our maritime security partners understand the remaining re-
strictions on disclosure and the reasons for them.
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